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ON THE PROBLEM OF PARADISE
Laura Frances Callahan
Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs (BHI) claim that evil must be evidence against 
God’s existence, because the absence of evil would be (presumably excel-
lent) evidence for it. Their argument is obviously valid on standard Bayesian 
epistemology. But in addition to raising a few reasons one might doubt its 
premise, I here highlight the rather misleading meaning, in BHI’s argument, 
of evil’s being evidence against God. BHI seek to establish that if one learned 
simply “that there was evil,” perhaps via an oracle, one would gain evidence 
of some strength or other against God. But when we commonly observe that 
there is evil in the world, we learn a stronger proposition. And determining 
the evidential impact of that stronger proposition is not so easy. The interest-
ing questions about the evidential impact of even a general awareness of evil 
in the world remain open.
1. Introduction
Is evil in the world evidence against the existence of God?1 Many—both 
theists and atheists—think so. Of course, such theists may maintain that, 
on balance, the totality of evidence bearing on God’s existence points 
in the other direction. But some—notable recent representatives being 
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann (hereafter HSB)2—think 
we should not take evil to be evidence against God’s existence at all. When 
we weigh up considerations for and against theism, evil ought not even 
to come into play. Roughly, this is because we have no good reason for 
thinking evil confirms atheism over theism.
In a highly interesting recent paper, Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, 
and Yoaav Isaacs (hereafter BHI) evaluate many of the dialectical moves 
and arguments in recent literature on evil and evidence.3 However, in 
what follows I will focus exclusively on one point they make. BHI at-
tempt to meet HSB’s challenge to provide good reason for thinking evil 
1More fully, “Is the proposition that there is evil in the world evidence against the propo-
sition that God exists?” For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that propositions are 
what confirm and are confirmed in evidential relationships, and I will follow the literature 
in using nouns and noun phrases (“evil in the world,” “the existence of God”) as shorthand 
for those propositions. 
2Howard-Snyder and Bergmann, “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than 
Theism.”
3Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs, “Evil and Evidence.”
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confirms atheism over theism by inviting us to consider what they call the 
“problem of paradise.” Their argument purports to establish that evil is 
evidence against God’s existence.
If it were successful, this argument would seem to establish an impor-
tant conclusion. BHI are careful not to claim that evil is decisive or even 
strong evidence against God’s existence; however, their claiming that it is 
definitely evidence of some strength or other is still quite interesting. But 
it seems to me that one may well doubt their argument’s success. First, 
dialectically, it is not an effective argument against radical skeptical theists 
like HSB who (it seems) should simply deny its premise. Indeed, I will 
argue that even if one isn’t a radical skeptical theist, one might well doubt 
BHI’s needed premise. Moreover, even if one takes the argument to be 
sound, one should note that what BHI think “evil being evidence against 
God” amounts to is a somewhat unintuitive, highly qualified claim. Their 
conclusion, then, understood in the qualified way in which they mean it, 
seems not to engage with the reasons that most philosophers (and theists) 
have wondered whether evil constitutes such evidence.
I will proceed by first reviewing the arguments from HSB and BHI in 
section 2. Then I will comment very briefly on BHI’s dialectical effective-
ness against radical skeptical theism in section 3. In section 4, I review 
some basic facts about what rational agents do when they learn a proposi-
tion in various ways, and then in sections 5 and 6, I argue that a realistic 
construal of learning about evil does not have the result that rational 
individuals definitely should treat evil as evidence against God. Before 
closing, in section 7 I note a separate objection to BHI’s argument: that 
atheism as they conceive of it is too broad and amorphous to obviously 
predict much.
2. Arguments from HSB and BHI
HSB present their argument as follows:4
(1) Grounds for belief in God aside, evil makes belief in atheism more rea-
sonable for us than belief in theism only if somebody has a good argu-
ment that displays how evil makes atheism more likely than theism.
(2) Nobody has a good argument that displays how evil makes atheism 
more likely than theism.
(3) So, grounds for belief in God aside, evil does not make belief in atheism 
more reasonable for us than belief in theism.
Now, a few clarifications: for HSB—and throughout this paper—
“theism” is just the proposition that God—i.e., a unique omniscient, 
omnibenevolent, omnipotent creator of the universe5—exists. It is not as 
4HSB, “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism,” 14. 
5HSB themselves don’t clarify the claim “God exists.” But they are directly responding 
to an essay by Rowe, who writes, “Theism is the view that there exists an all-powerful, 
all-knowing, perfectly good being (God)” (Rowe, “Evil is Evidence,” 4). BHI, likewise, are 
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clear what they mean by “atheism.” But BHI, in objecting to HSB’s argu-
ment, take atheism to be just theism’s negation.6 Also, given that HSB are 
attempting to establish the evidential irrelevance of evil, we ought to un-
derstand their repeated use of the clause “evil makes atheism more likely 
than theism” as something like, “evil raises the likelihood of atheism over 
theism,” or, “evil confirms atheism over theism.” Whether evil makes 
atheism more likely overall is clearly a further issue. Understood this way, 
BHI deny premise 2. They claim they are in possession of a good argument 
that displays how evil confirms atheism over theism.
Their argument employs formal Bayesian models, in which “a piece 
of evidence is evidence for a hypothesis just in case that evidence raises 
the probability of that hypothesis . . . just in case that evidence is likelier 
to come about if the hypothesis is true than if the hypothesis is false.”7 
Of course, both “evidence” and “probability” are understood variously—
controversies which neither BHI nor HSB address explicitly. It seems 
charitable (or at least harmless) to understand BHI as discussing normative 
subjective probabilities. BHI will argue that evil is evidence against God, 
meaning roughly that rational agents downgrade (to some, perhaps tiny, 
degree) credence in God’s existence because of it.8
BHI’s crucial claim—what I have referred to in the introduction as their 
“premise”—is that the absence of all evil is epistemically likelier to come 
about if theism is true than if atheism is. This will be intuitively compel-
ling, the story goes, for anyone who reflects on paradise.
Consider a world of pleasures with no pain, of goods with no evil—an 
Eden. If the world were like that, then we think that would constitute a 
fairly overwhelming argument for the existence of God. . . . But if the prob-
ability of God is higher given the complete absence of evil (in an Edenic 
clearly attempting to weigh in on existing arguments (including, in the problem of paradise 
argument discussed here, HSB’s own). In a footnote, they claim:
Unless otherwise noted, we use the term ‘God’ in a fairly loose, minimal way. 
Our arguments are consistent with, but do not presuppose, the traditional concep-
tion of God as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. For these purposes, 
take the hypothesis that God exists to be the hypothesis that an extremely knowl-
edgeable, extremely powerful, extremely benevolent being exists (BHI, “Evil and 
Evidence,” 1n2).
6BHI’s explanation of the problem of paradise argument (“Evil and Evidence,” 5), where 
they consider theism as an instance of “H” and atheism as an instance of “~H,” commits 
them to this definition. 
7BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 3–4, emphasis mine.
8BHI do not in the problem of paradise section address the situation in which a reason-
able person antecedently knows, is certain, or even (flat-out) believes that God exists, and the 
limitations on their argument I wish to press will not appeal to these possibilities. (BHI do 
however discuss the possibility of knowing theism to be true in section 12.1 of their paper.) 
Moreover, BHI do not weigh in on cases in general where one has irrational priors (although 
they do consider one case of odd priors; “Evil and Evidence,” 6n15). The claim is not that for 
any agent, regardless of her priors, rationality requires downgrading confidence in theism. 
Rather, it’s something like: for agents with roughly normal or rational priors, rationality will 
require their downgrading confidence. 
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world), then the presence of evil (as in our world) must reduce the prob-
ability of God.9
Note that one need not make any particular probability assignments 
about the likelihood of evil on theism and atheism in order for this to be 
convincing; one need only make a certain comparative judgment about 
those probabilities. (“Paradise” is likelier conditional on theism than on 
atheism.) And that comparative judgment does seem, perhaps, difficult 
to deny. But once one has granted that the absence of evil is evidence for 
theism (i.e., it’s more likely to occur on theism than on atheism), one must 
also conclude that the presence of evil is evidence against theism. After all, 
if the absence of evil is likelier to occur on theism than on atheism, then the 
presence of evil must be likelier on atheism than on theism.
To help illustrate how BHI are thinking of evidence and the importance 
of relative likelihoods, I will include here the helpful diagrams from the 
following section of their paper, depicting what happens when we rational 
agents learn there is evil in the world.10 We start with some assignment of 
prior probabilities to the world being in each of the following four states:
Theism Theism Atheism Atheism
No evil Evil No evil Evil
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Then, upon learning that there is evil in the world, we eliminate [1] and 
[3].
Theism Theism Atheism Atheism
No evil Evil No evil Evil
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Now, having observed evil, we are certain that the world is either as in 
[2] or [4]. Standard Bayesian updating requires that we then preserve the 
ratio of our prior probabilities for [2] and [4], but “expand” these to cover 
100 percent of our epistemic probability space.11
The prior probability for theism was, before learning there is evil 
in the world, just P([1]) + P([2]). The prior probability for atheism was 
P([3]) + P([4]). But now the probability for theism is just P([2]), and that 
for atheism just P([4]). Whether the probability for theism drops in this 
9BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 4–5.
10Diagrams from BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 6–7. I have followed BHI in making each 
numbered section an equal size. Although proportional sizes would have aided visualiza-
tion, I am not comfortable making assumptions about how large these boxes should be with 
respect to theism and atheism. Some of my reasons for this will become clear in section 6. 
11See van Fraassen (Laws and Symmetry, 161–162) on “Muddy Venn Diagrams.”
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maneuver depends entirely on whether P([3]) was a smaller percentage 
of the total prior probability for atheism than P([1]) was of the total prior 
probability for theism. Or in other words, it depends on whether theism 
lost a bigger portion of its probability space when [1] and [3] dropped out.
When BHI present the problem of paradise, they are actually inviting 
us to consider the opposite maneuver. What if, instead of eliminating [1] 
and [3] on finding evil in the world, we had found ourselves in “paradise” 
and so eliminated [2] and [4]? Well, BHI think this would obviously con-
firm theism. So, [4] must be a bigger portion of atheistic probability space 
than [2] is of theistic probability space. This entails, mathematically, that 
[3] is a smaller portion of atheistic probability space than [1] is of theistic 
probability space. Hence, say BHI, evil is evidence against God.
3. Dialectical Limitation: Skeptical Immunity
Now, this “problem of paradise” argument may beg the question against 
BHI’s putative target interlocutors. As I understand them, HSB and other 
radical skeptical theists are convinced of the epistemic probabilistic inde-
pendence of theism and the world’s being in any certain state with respect 
to goods and evils. If this is correct, they can simply deny that BHI’s 
comparative claim about the likelihood paradise on theism vs. atheism 
“sounds right,” or at least that this is significant. After all, they might say, 
these probabilities are unfathomably complex matters, and even making a 
comparative judgment of the kind BHI suggest requires an ability to assess 
modal and moral facts that we simply don’t have.12 The proper response to 
BHI’s suggestion might seem to be a shrug, not a nod. Dialectically, then, 
BHI’s problem of paradise would fail as a response to HSB.
BHI do acknowledge this important limitation, noting “our argu-
ments are not compatible with radical uncertainty about the probabilities 
involved.”13 However, presumably BHI expect that many (including perhaps 
some less-radical “skeptical theists”) will find their particular judgment 
about the comparative likelihood of paradise on theism vs. atheism highly 
intuitive and difficult to deny. They also attempt to dissuade readers from 
the radical uncertainty that would block their argument by, following 
others in the recent literature on skeptical theism, drawing attention to 
the way such uncertainty seems to commit us to skepticism on other mat-
ters.14 To those who (perhaps swayed by BHI’s other arguments) are not 
12See HSB (“Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism,” 22). See also 
Peter van Inwagen (The Problem of Evil, 115–116), who defends a similarly extreme modal/
moral skepticism.
13BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 14.
14See, e.g., BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 15; Hasker, Triumph of God, 121; Maitzen, “The Moral 
Skepticism Objection to Skeptical Theism”; Maitzen, “Agnosticism, Skeptical Theism, and 
Moral Obligation”; O’Connor, “Theistic Objections to Skeptical Theism”; Wilks, “The Global 
Skeptical Response to Skeptical Theism.” See also Howard-Snyder (“Epistemic Humility, 
Arguments from Evil, and Moral Skepticism” and “Agnosticism, the Moral Skepticism Ob-
jection, and Commonsense Morality”) for an interesting defense of skeptical theism against 
the charge of requiring moral skepticism.
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radical skeptics about moral and modal reasoning with probabilities, BHI’s 
problem of paradise argument may indeed seem convincing.
I say “may” and “seem.” In what follows I want to examine two reasons 
to worry about their argument that make no appeal to our total inability to 
make the relevant kinds of modal or moral judgments.15
4. Interlude: Learning a Proposition
BHI are asking us to think about the impact on rational individuals of 
learning that there is evil in the world. In this section, I want to call at-
tention to the fact that there are many ways to learn that there is evil in 
the world (to learn any proposition, in fact). For example, I suppose one 
could be told the proposition by some highly reliable testifier—perhaps 
an oracle. Alternatively, one could simply observe one’s own or others’ 
pain and conclude that there is evil in the world. But each of these methods 
of learning that there is evil would result in a different total strength of the 
proposition learned. From an oracle one could perhaps glean the bare fact 
that there is some evil, but from observation one will gain knowledge of 
particular evils as well. There is, then, the possibility that what is actually 
learned in various learning-about-evil scenarios will have different effects 
on the credence adjustments of rational individuals.
It may be helpful to illustrate this possibility with an example. Imagine 
that you are going to be given a cake tonight. It’s your birthday, and your 
friend Sue is coming over, having promised to bring you one. You know 
that it’s going to be one of three kinds: chocolate, coconut, or lemon. You 
also know that she will not fail to bring some sort of sauce or topping—
either whipped cream or gelato. If she brings chocolate or coconut cake, 
then it will probably be whipped cream—but just possibly gelato. On the 
other hand, if she brings lemon, then she will likely bring gelato. You are 
secretly hoping to have her gelato, but you really have no idea which of 
the three sorts of cake she will bring.
Now, I want to make a distinction between two ways you might learn 
that Sue is not going to be bringing chocolate cake tonight. You might be 
told, in conversation with a highly credible source (perhaps Sue herself), 
“I’ll give you a hint—it’s not going to be the chocolate this time.” If that 
happened, you would rationally adjust your credences by eliminating the 
possibility of chocolate and renormalizing (i.e., increasing your credence 
in each of the other possibilities so that they collectively sum to 1, in a way 
that preserves the initial ratios among them). And this would look struc-
turally similar to the exercise BHI recommend above. Gelato is likelier than 
it was before given that Sue is not bringing chocolate, because the (now 
eliminated) regions of probability space in which Sue brings chocolate 
15Nor will I object to any particular interpretations of probability or evidence mentioned 
in the previous section. In general, I am attempting to see what we should think of BHI’s 
argument even if we are happy to consider it largely on BHI’s own turf. 
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constituted a larger percentage of the total regions in which she brings 
whipped cream than of those in which she brings gelato.
But there’s another way you could learn Sue will not be bringing choco-
late cake: by learning the stronger proposition that instead she will be 
bringing coconut cake. This is a very simple point, but the illustration will 
prove helpful. If Sue walks in displaying a coconut cake but with its ac-
companying topping still packed away out of sight, you will adjust your 
credence that she has brought gelato down.
Intuitively, both of the scenarios just described are ones in which you 
learn that Sue isn’t bringing chocolate cake. But because the ways you learn 
this in each scenario differ, and specifically because in the second scenario 
you “simultaneously” learn a stronger proposition, these scenarios require 
different rational adjustments to your assessment of the probability of 
having gelato.
Similarly, I want to stress that what one actually learns when one learns 
about evil in the world (i) will be a stronger proposition than merely “that 
there is some evil,” and (ii) may not obviously or necessarily require a 
negative adjustment to one’s credence in theism.
5. A New Proposition to Consider: M
To show this, I don’t need to make any contentious empirical claims about 
the very specific propositions people learn about evil or their evidential 
impact. Instead I will consider an extremely weak proposition, one al-
most as weak as the bare fact that there is some evil. (In the next section 
I will briefly defend the claim that we need to consider a proposition at 
least this strong, in thinking about the evidential impact of evil.) Here 
my aim is just to introduce the proposition and address a few possible 
misunderstandings.
BHI’s partitioning of probability space into “Evil” and “No evil” worlds 
seems to me to ignore an important and relevant distinction among the 
former. BHI invite us to consider the existence of an Edenic “paradise” 
(henceforth “P”), and I grant here that this is a coherent possibility. But 
there’s another extreme possibility worth considering: the world being a 
cruel wasteland (henceforth “W”), where there is absolutely no beauty or 
joy or comfort or kindness or love—only much suffering and evil.
I claim that, intuitively, such a possibility is at least as coherent as P. 
In support, I’d like first to point out that P itself isn’t terribly coherent. 
BHI instruct us to imagine P as follows: “Hold fixed as best as possible 
the amount and kinds of goodness of our world, but remove all the evil 
and suffering.”16 I am not at all sure how to follow these instructions. 
(For example, am I allowed to “hold fixed” goods like compassion, or the 
pleasures of hard-won achievement, despite the fact that these logically 
entail some suffering? Moreover, wouldn’t a true “Edenic paradise” (BHI’s 
other gloss on P) contain not only less evil but more good than our current 
16BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 4n12.
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world?) Given that their description of P is nonspecific and problematic, I 
take it that W’s being “as coherent” does not require much. I am roughly 
thinking of W as the world that results when we hold fixed (and maybe 
also increase) the amount and kinds of evil and suffering in the world, but 
remove all goodness. Note that both P and W are additionally, notoriously 
problematic if we slip into thinking of these as maximally good and bad 
worlds.17
Also, note that the idea is not that the world in W is similar to Hell, on 
a classical Christian understanding. It is not built into W that any sentient 
beings in the world are being tortured by God or any supernatural being, 
just as it is not built into P that all sentient beings in the world are being 
supernaturally blessed.
If W is at least as coherent as P, then it seems natural to me to distin-
guish at least three important possibilities where BHI identify two: no evil 
(P), total or extreme evil (W), and “some” or “middling” evil (M).18 I take 
it this is a more helpful way to partition our epistemic probability space. 
This is true at least in part because, as I argue below, it better isolates what 
we learn about evil in realistic learning scenarios. And if this is the case, 
then we need to distinguish between two importantly different ways of 
learning that one is not in P: either one learns it simply—perhaps from a 
credible source, via testimony; or one learns specifically that one is in M.
6. Learning Too Much
The only realistic or common way to observe that one is not in paradise 
(~P) is via observing, specifically, that there is some middling level of evil 
in the world (M), or in other words that the world is a good-and-bad place. 
Consider the temporality of this learning process. Even if such learning 
happens very quickly, one is unlikely to hit upon evil in isolation. A 
human life that has reached some age at which observation is possible 
will, presumably, have experienced nourishment and human touch, at a 
minimum. But I do not want to get mired in early childhood psychology. 
My basic point is that the world is a mixture of good and evil (M), and 
it presents itself as such. We learn ~P (and, as it happens, ~W) by rapid 
deduction from M, or from “the strange mixture of good and ill which 
appears in life.”19
Note that this method of learning resembles the version of my cake 
example in which Sue walks in, not only without a chocolate cake, but with 
the coconut instead. What happens to the idealized Bayesian agent when 
17On some views of evil, on which it is a privation, the difficulties raised by maximally bad 
or evil worlds may differ from those raised by maximally good ones. However, it would be 
odd, to say the least, if the effectiveness of BHI’s argument depended on any specific view of 
evil. Thanks to Donald Bungum for raising this issue. 
18This is oversimplifying, of course. There are in fact infinitely many possibilities—“M” is 
a broad family of ways the world might be.
19Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, XI, 113.
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she learns M? Borrowing from BHI’s illustrations, she would perform the 
following elimination:
Theism Theism Theism Atheism Atheism Atheism
P M W P M W
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
In order for this operation to disconfirm theism, it would have to be 
the case that (P([5]) + P([7])) is a greater proportion of the total prior prob-
ability of theism than (P([8]) + P([10])) is of the total prior probability for 
atheism. Now, there are some prior probability distributions for which 
this would be the case. But is it obvious that this will be the case, for each 
and every rational prior probability distribution?20 In their paper, BHI ap-
pealed to the simple idea that P is more likely on theism than atheism, and 
therefore they could claim, “There is a wide range of reasonable-seeming 
probability assignments for which our reasoning holds.”21 But there is no 
similar, intuitively compelling comparison of the likelihood of “either P 
or W” occurring conditional on theism vs. atheism. After all, perhaps W 
seems far more likely on atheism than on theism, and this tipping of the 
scale would compete with the opposing weight that, as BHI claim, stems 
from the “problem of paradise.”
Now, one might think W actually seems more likely on theism, given 
that the worst worlds we can imagine contain something like specifi-
cally “Dante-an” horrors—horrors for which the existence of God seems 
required. But this objection seems to derive much of its force from a confu-
sion. Remember that the use of “theism” and “atheism” is quite artificial 
here; the distinction does not map neatly onto the divide between “su-
pernatural” and “natural” worldviews. Atheism actually encompasses 
versions of pantheism and also, e.g., theories on which there is a unique 
and omnipotent but evil, hateful creator. The question to focus on is: is the 
worst world (W) more likely on the supposition that there is a unique, 
good God, or on the supposition that there is any other arrangement “in the 
heavens?”22 And I submit that, even if the latter answer is not obvious, it is 
certainly plausible. Once we have to take into account the effects of elimi-
nating both P and W, it is simply not clear that finding middling evil in 
the world should reduce a rational person’s credence in theism. This is just 
an instance of the non-monotonicity of evidence in general; whether ~P 
20I do not mean to weigh in here on whether there can be more than one rational set of 
priors. My argument will work in either case.
21BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 7.
22The probability of W on atheism will be affected not only by the various versions of 
atheism but also their relative probabilities. Still it seems reasonable to think the probability 
of W on atheism could be higher than on theism.
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confirms atheism does not settle whether M or the stronger propositions 
about evil we actually learn do likewise.23
But perhaps, instead of idealizing our common learning-via-observation 
of the world, BHI want to model an even more highly idealized, oracle-
delivery sort of learning. One has no idea whether or not there is evil in 
the world, and one learns (simply) that there is. One updates accordingly, 
redistributing one’s credences between W and M.
The primary issue with this construal of BHI’s argument is that the 
extraordinary character of the imagined learning process renders it irrel-
evant to the interesting, ongoing debate at hand over the evidential impact 
of facts about evil.
What is at stake, when we ask whether evil is evidence against God? 
What do we really want to know? Well, we might want to know whether 
learning about particular evils in the world always constitutes evidence 
against God’s existence; then BHI’s argument would clearly be irrelevant. 
They are instead concerned with something like a general awareness of 
evil. But let’s grant that the evidential impact of a general awareness of 
evil is also interesting. We might indeed want to ask, “Is there-being-evil-
in-general evidence against God?”
But even in asking that question, I (at any rate) would want to know 
something importantly, subtly different than the proper response to 
learning that there is evil from an oracle. I would want to know whether 
people, insofar as they are rational, must at some point downgrade their 
assessment of the probability of God’s existence in light of what they actu-
ally learn about evil in the world. Must a general awareness of evil sit on 
the negative side of an evidential scale, so that we say things like: “When 
I think about [the testimony of a trusted community, the fine-tuning argu-
ment, and “religious” or “spiritual” experiences I’ve had] it seems to me 
quite likely that God exists. But then when I think about what I’ve learned 
about evil in the world, I step that back (a little bit, or a lot)”?
The problem is that BHI’s argument is not straightforwardly relevant to 
that question, either. What we learn about evil in the world is much richer 
than ~P; it’s certainly at least as strong as M. And M—the fact that there is 
some middling amount of evil in the world—may, but certainly does not 
obviously or necessarily, require negatively adjusting one’s probability for 
God’s existence. Call this the “realistic learning” limitation on BHI’s argu-
ment; their conclusion properly understood is just silent on what rational 
agents should do with facts about evil in even halfway realistic learning 
scenarios.
7. Atheism As a Predictor
Finally, allow me to return to a point I made in the previous section and 
explain why I take this to ground a true objection to the soundness of 
23For a statement of monotonicity and discussion of some of the trouble such an assumption 
can cause, see Fitelson and Hawthorne, “The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.”
139ON THE PROBLEM OF PARADISE
BHI’s argument, no matter how limited we allow its conclusion to be. 
BHI’s treating “atheism” as the negation of traditional monotheism 
renders judgments about what would be likely conditional on atheism 
extremely difficult to make. Atheism, for them, is just too broad a hypoth-
esis to predict much. Although I have so far tried insofar as possible to 
accept many of BHI’s assumptions and intuitions, I think that once one 
fully appreciates what is needed in order to assess the likelihood of some 
piece of evidence conditional on atheism—i.e., considering its likelihood 
on all disparate “worldviews” other than traditional monotheism and 
then accounting for the relative likelihoods of those worldviews—one 
may well be skeptical even of BHI’s “intuitive” judgment in the problem 
of paradise. Is paradise really more likely on theism than on its negation, 
given that its negation includes forms of pantheism, belief in Life Forces, 
etc.? The more I think about it, the less sure I am. Call this the “too-broad 
competitor” objection.24
Now, if BHI were to redefine atheism more naturally, their judgment 
that paradise would confirm theism over atheism would be more difficult 
to deny (for those of us who aren’t radical skeptical theists, anyway). But 
note, first, that my “realistic learning limitation” would remain in force 
for the imagined reconstruction. And second, note that paradise might 
then also seem to confirm other competing worldviews relative to theism 
or atheism (a certain, very happy pantheism, perhaps). If this were the 
case, BHI still could not claim that learning one is not in paradise (as from 
an oracle) should definitely lower one’s confidence in theism. Instead it 
might just lower the ratio of one’s probabilities for theism vs. atheism; 
both absolute probabilities could increase.
8. Conclusion
BHI point out that if paradise is more likely on theism than on its nega-
tion (a somewhat dubious premise, given the dialectical limitation and the 
too-broad competitor objection I’ve pressed), and we are happy to think of 
“evil” as just the fact that there is some—the kind of fact one might learn 
from an oracle but far too thin to be learned realistically—then, evil is 
evidence against the existence of God. This is, to my mind, less interesting 
or important than it might at first seem.
I claim it’s more natural to think of “evil” as the evil we learn about via 
ordinary learning processes, and also more natural to think about goods 
and evils in the world together. These assumptions underlie my realistic 
learning limitation. In closing, I’d like to acknowledge explicitly that even 
“M” is clearly far too thin a proposition to capture what we actually learn 
when we observe goods and evils in the world. We don’t merely learn 
that the world is both good and bad. Instead we observe particular evils 
that suggest some narrow sliver of M—“about this much evil and good, 
24Thanks to an anonymous referee from this journal for encouraging me to develop this 
point into a separate objection. 
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including events X, Y, Z . . . ” Questions about the conditions under which 
such a specific proposition should count as evidence against the existence 
of God seem, to my mind, to lie at the heart of the interesting issues in this 
debate. Unfortunately, addressing such questions properly would require 
a much longer discussion.
Here, in closing, I want to just (all-too-briefly) consider one “BHI-style” 
response to such questions that has been suggested to me. Could we say 
(bracketing my too-broad competitor objection for the moment) that, for 
all rational individuals, the worse the world is, the greater the evidence 
against theism? I think not. Even if one accepts that paradise is quite likely 
on theism, one needn’t think that extremely-good-but-not-perfect worlds 
are at all conditionally likely. Imagine an “almost Edenic paradise” where 
one person, on one day, gets a hangnail. Is that a world God would be at 
all likely to create? Presumably, systemic and even substantial patterns of 
evil are more likely conditional on theism, given that God would have to 
have good reason for permitting any at all. Note that all theodicies and 
defenses identify (possible) value in God’s allowing some evil in the world. 
At any rate, many versions of theism that theists in fact find quite plau-
sible, whether explicitly paired with theodicy or not, predict substantial 
evil. (BHI explicitly acknowledge this in section 5 of their paper, where 
they say evil is not evidence against Christianity.) Moreover, it is clear 
that for many such actually-believed versions of theism, disconfirming 
“surprises” could occur in either direction—i.e., the world could be too 
good. One attracted to the classical Christian doctrine of Hell might ra-
tionally downgrade the probability of theism upon learning (somehow) 
that it didn’t exist. The evidential impact of evil on theism is an extremely 
complex and messy affair, best acknowledged as such.25
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